The Titan Submersible Disaster Hearings Paint a Damning Picture.
One week into the US Coast Guard’s OceanGate hearings, new revelations about the events leading up to the Titan submersible disaster have come to light. The hearings, which are part of the Marine Board of Investigation, have presented a slew of information through ten witnesses and numerous exhibits.
However, despite all the disclosures, the central mystery of why the Titan failed during its June 2023 voyage to the Titanic wreck remains unresolved. More so, the question of accountability for the loss of five lives still hangs in the air. Here’s a look at what the hearings have revealed so far and some crucial unanswered questions.
The Two Sides of Stockton Rush
OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush, who tragically perished while piloting the Titan, has been at the heart of much of the testimony. During the first two days of hearings, several witnesses placed the blame squarely on his shoulders. Tony Nissen, OceanGate’s former director of engineering, painted a damning picture of Rush’s decision-making, characterising him as someone who often prioritised speed and cost over safety.
According to Nissen, Rush’s approach was erratic, changing direction frequently. His insistence on using the Titan’s carbon fibre hull, despite safety concerns, eventually led to Nissen being fired after he pushed to scrap the initial hull design.
David Lochridge, a former director of marine operations for OceanGate, also shared troubling accounts of Rush’s behaviour. He described an incident where Rush, during a dive to the Andrea Doria wreck, made serious piloting errors, panicked, and threw the controller at Lochridge’s head. According to Lochridge, Rush had a tendency to blame others for his mistakes and created a culture of intimidation.
David Lochridge, a former director of marine operations for OceanGate, also shared troubling accounts of Rush’s behaviour. He described an incident where Rush, during a dive to the Andrea Doria wreck, made serious piloting errors, panicked, and threw the controller at Lochridge’s head. According to Lochridge, Rush had a tendency to blame others for his mistakes and created a culture of intimidation.
Lochridge further testified that Rush even directed the use of parts from a home improvement store for critical submersible components, a decision that further underscored his disregard for accepted safety norms.
However, Rush wasn’t without his defenders. Renata Rojas, an OceanGate passenger on previous expeditions, rejected Lochridge’s account and described Rush as fair and reasonable. Fred Hagen, another passenger, echoed this sentiment, praising Rush’s intellect and commitment to safety. However, Hagen did acknowledge that the Titan’s expeditions were inherently high-risk ventures and were never meant to be entirely safe. "It was supposed to be a thrilling adventure," Hagen stated during the hearings.
However, Rush wasn’t without his defenders. Renata Rojas, an OceanGate passenger on previous expeditions, rejected Lochridge’s account and described Rush as fair and reasonable. Fred Hagen, another passenger, echoed this sentiment, praising Rush’s intellect and commitment to safety. However, Hagen did acknowledge that the Titan’s expeditions were inherently high-risk ventures and were never meant to be entirely safe. "It was supposed to be a thrilling adventure," Hagen stated during the hearings.
Titan’s Unusual Design and Development
The Titan submersible’s design has been a major point of contention throughout the hearings. Nissen defended his initial design, but it was revealed that the vessel did not adhere to industry standards for submersible construction. The carbon fibre hull, a central element of the Titan’s design, was only tested in a single scale model, which failed early during high-pressure trials. Despite this, OceanGate proceeded with constructing a full-scale version.
Several witnesses expressed concerns about the submersible’s construction and lack of adherence to industry norms. Dave Dyer, an engineer at the University of Washington, testified that his lab ceased collaboration with OceanGate in 2016 due to concerns about the company’s insistence on using glass control spheres that posed a significant risk of explosion at depth. These spheres were meant to house control electronics for the Titan’s thrusters, and their failure could have catastrophic consequences.
Instead of conducting thorough inspections of the Titan’s first hull or specifying a finite number of dives before decommissioning it, OceanGate relied on an unproven acoustic monitoring system to warn of impending failure. Lochridge, who raised alarms about the design and operation, referred to the Titan as “an abomination” and expressed particular disdain for the carbon fibre hull. Both he and Nissen made it clear that they would never have dived in the vessel, given the risks involved.
A History of Troubled Titanic Missions
OceanGate’s earlier missions to the Titanic, starting in 2021, were plagued with technical issues. During one dive, the Titan’s forward titanium dome fell off, while another mission reported concerning acoustic readings that hinted at hull integrity issues. The problems only mounted in subsequent expeditions. A Coast Guard report listed 70 equipment malfunctions requiring attention after the 2021 missions, though this number decreased to 48 in 2022. Yet, the remaining issues were still severe, with some missions significantly extended due to dead batteries and recovery damages.
In one particularly worrying instance, a loud bang was heard when the submersible surfaced in 2022, prompting contractor Antonella Wilby to consider reporting the matter to OceanGate’s board of directors. Wilby ultimately refrained from doing so after being warned that such action could result in a lawsuit. She shared her concerns during the hearings, lamenting the toxic work culture that discouraged employees from voicing safety concerns.
In the Titan’s second-to-last dive, contractor Tym Catterson admitted to skipping a critical safety check, which left the submersible listing at a 45-degree angle for an hour. This misstep, along with other overlooked safety measures, further compounded the already troubling series of events that preceded the vessel’s fatal last dive.
Conflicting Views on the Carbon Fibre Hull
The carbon fibre hull has been at the centre of the ongoing debates. Dave Dyer and Tony Nissen defended the use of carbon fibre, with Nissen maintaining that computer simulations and the acoustic monitoring system could extend the hull’s lifespan indefinitely. However, Lochridge, Catterson, and former HR director Bonnie Carl expressed deep reservations about the hull’s safety. Carl admitted she lacked an engineering background but nonetheless felt that the hull was not fit for purpose.
Next week’s hearings are expected to shed more light on the matter, with testimony from Phil Brooks, Nissen’s successor, and a Boeing carbon fibre expert. Notably, an engineer from the National Transportation Safety Board’s Materials Laboratory will testify about the wreckage of the Titan, which may finally reveal the cause of the implosion.
The Role of the US Coast Guard
An important question that looms over the hearings is the role of the US Coast Guard. Several witnesses have pointed out that the Titan should have been inspected by the Coast Guard before it was allowed to take paying passengers on board. So far, no one has provided a clear answer as to why this did not happen, though Lochridge testified that he had notified the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) about his concerns in 2018, and that OSHA had communicated his complaints to the Coast Guard.
Next week’s hearings will feature five US Coast Guard witnesses, including individuals from Puget Sound, near OceanGate’s headquarters. It is hoped that their testimonies will provide clarity on why the Titan was allowed to operate despite evident safety issues.
Missing Witnesses
As the hearings enter their final phase, there are several key witnesses conspicuously absent. OceanGate employees Wendy Rush, Scott Griffith, and Neil McCurdy, who played pivotal roles in decision-making throughout the company’s history, have not been called to testify. Neither have any representatives from the companies that manufactured the Titan’s hulls. The Coast Guard has not explained these omissions, though some have speculated that it could be because these witnesses would invoke their Fifth Amendment rights and refuse to answer questions.
As the US Coast Guard hearings progress, the full scope of the Titan submersible disaster is gradually coming to light. While the hearings have uncovered serious concerns about the vessel’s design, operation, and safety culture at OceanGate, critical questions remain. Next week’s testimony may provide answers, but for now, the tragedy of the Titan continues to be a stark reminder of the dangers that come with cutting corners in the pursuit of adventure.

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